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Jeanette Bicknell
Love, Beauty, and yeats’s “anne GreGory”
never shall a young man,
thrown into despair
By those great honey-coloured
ramparts at your ear,
Love you for yourself alone
and not your yellow hair.
so begins “For anne Gregory,” published by W. B. yeats in 1933. It is surely one of his most charming poems.1 the poem’s lilting rhythm 
and affectionate tone effectively soften—even disguise—what is arguably 
a dark and dismaying message. anne is destined to be loved not for 
herself alone, but for an accidental physical attribute—her blond hair. 
Why do I claim that the poem’s message is dark? Why should it dismay 
anne if she is loved for the beauty of her hair? Is that not better, after 
all, than not being loved in the irst place? and what would it be to love 
anne for herself “alone”? Love anne for her sweet disposition; for her 
ability always to say the right thing; for her kindness; but for her yellow 
hair? relections on these questions take us to the heart of some of the 
most crucial philosophical problems of romantic love. Can one draw 
a neat line between rational and irrational (or at least, non-rational) 
motives for loving another, or for pursuing love? We might call this 
question the “anne Gregory problem.”2 
In the Western tradition the origins of philosophical relections on 
love, as of so many other things, can be traced to the works of Plato. 
the account of love offered in the Symposium is hierarchical, taking 
the form of a ladder. the love of the beauty of a particular boy is but a 
irst step that is to be ultimately transcended by a love of beauty itself. 
Interpreters disagree as to whether love for that irst individual is cast 
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aside in the ascent up the ladder, or whether it is more correctly the 
intensity of the lover’s initial passion for a particular individual that 
must be transcended.3 Whatever the outcome of this question, it may 
strike us as bizarre that the love of a particular individual is seen as 
an inferior stage that must be surpassed. What is love, if not love for 
concrete  others? there is something unseemly about considering one’s 
beloved or oneself as steps on a ladder of philosophical fulillment. yet 
the vision of love offered in yeats’s poem, in which the love of an indi-
vidual is seen as secondary to a love of one of her physical attributes, 
should strike us as equally unsatisfactory. 
Platonists or not, we seem to have conlicting intuitions about love 
and rationality. on the one hand, love is considered non-rational 
because it is not subject to volitional control. Cupid is often depicted 
as blindfolded, so that his arrows fall where they may with little regard 
to the appropriateness of their targets. We love some people and not 
others, and that is all there is to it. Imagine hearing a single friend 
describe a meeting with a potential romantic partner; he recounts the 
many good qualities of the person he has met, yet concludes that he 
has no wish to pursue a relationship or see that person again. even if 
our friend cannot offer a reasoned justiication of his reluctance, we 
would not conclude that he is behaving irrationally. other things being 
equal, we would probably accept both his assessment of the meeting 
and his decision not to seek further involvement. the non-rationality 
of love is even more evident in the case of familial love. Parents love 
their children simply because they are their children. they do not love 
the children because of speciic qualities the children possess, although 
the character and quality of parental love may be responsive to such 
qualities. Harry Frankfurt has offered the most robust philosophical 
defense of the view that love is non-rational.
on the other hand, we also seem to think that love (and the with-
holding of love) can be responsive to reasons. Philosophically, this type 
of view is associated with david velleman and niko Kolodny. reasons 
for love may be grounded in the qualities of the beloved or of a shared 
relationship. For many months in 2007, one of the most emailed articles 
from The New York Times website was a list of questions that couples were 
advised to ask one another before agreeing to marry. the questions very 
reasonably covered such practicalities as expectations about children and 
social roles within the marriage, and also about attitudes to inancial 
matters and sexuality. Clearly many believe that rationality has a role 
(or should have a role) in romantic love. We wonder why put-upon 
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or abused spouses continue to stay with their partners, relecting that 
they have perfectly good reasons to end such relationships. Familial 
love seems no less amenable to reasons. We expect familial love to take 
hold and endure, except in the face of overwhelming reasons why it 
should not. Parents who fail to bond with or seem indifferent to their 
children’s well-being seem strange, if not contemptible. Is the parent-
child connection itself not reason enough for love? 
there is room for a different response to the “anne Gregory problem.” 
I shall argue that rationality can have a place here, but not in the way 
one might expect. recent philosophical relections on love and rational-
ity share a crucial oversight. In focusing on the rationality of lovers they 
have overlooked the beloved. Whether or not loving someone admits 
of reasons, and whatever the nature of these reasons, the lover is only 
one of the possibly rational agents. We can also assess the rationality 
of the beloved, and the reasons he or she might have for accepting or 
resisting love. the rationality of love can be assessed in terms of what 
it is reasonable or appropriate to be loved for. someone who is content 
to be loved for the yellowness of her hair, and who expects this love to 
form the foundation of a reciprocal relationship, is not rational. 
I
yeats’s poem ends on a playful note, at once reinforcing and under-
cutting anne’s anxieties about the source of her lovability. the poet 
gives himself the last word, while doubly removing himself from the 
responsibility for those words:
I heard an old religious man
But yesternight declare
that he had found a text to prove
that only God, my dear,
Could love you for yourself alone
and not your yellow hair.
the upshot of the inal stanza is that it is humanly impossible to love 
anne for herself and not for her blonde hair. to do so would require 
a superhuman effort. Perhaps the poet—in invoking the old religious 
man and the text—means us to take the reply as humorous. Perhaps 
he means to make anne smile and set her at ease. one philosopher—
amelie oksenberg rorty claims that the poet’s reply to anne, although 
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sad, is sage and truthful (p. 399). this assessment is of a piece with her 
skeptical attitude to the possibility of offering general philosophical 
reasons for loving another. although reasons may be given, they can 
only be particular and relational, not abstract or general (and hence 
not philosophical).
according to rorty love is individuated by the character of the subject 
who loves, the object that is loved, and the relation between them, and 
it shares these features with a number of other psychological attitudes. 
one’s love for a spouse is not the same as the love one feels towards 
one’s parents or children, yet “love” may be the correct term for the 
feeling in each case. Love, together with a number of other psychologi-
cal attitudes, share a feature which rorty calls their “historicity.” What 
she means is that these attitudes are not static; they arise from and then 
are shaped by dynamic interactions between the subject and object. the 
love one person has for another is the product of a distinctive, and in 
some cases on-going, dynamic interaction. the beliefs and behaviour of 
the beloved arouse beliefs and behaviour in the lover. dynamic, interac-
tive and historical psychological attitudes have a number of features in 
common. they take as their proper objects persons, rather than charac-
teristics of persons. they are “permeable”—both the subject’s character 
and actions may be changed by details of the character of the beloved. 
Finally, these attitudes have a speciic narrative history.
the historicity of love allows it to be sensitive to changes in the 
characters and situations of the individuals involved, but it also arouses 
worries about love’s constancy. a love that is dynamic and responsive 
to changes in the object is also a love that can turn to indifference or 
worse, depending on changes in the object. rorty interprets the desire 
of anne in yeats’s poem to be loved “for herself alone” as an expression 
of anxiety about love’s constancy or endurance. she sees such concern 
about love to be a recent historical phenomenon that has arisen in a 
speciic cultural context, and claims that there are two reasons why 
contemporary lovers are so concerned with love’s constancy. First, we 
feel ourselves to be vulnerable in the world. second, we are aware of 
being constituted by the perceptions of others. If others—especially 
those closest to us—fail to perceive us aright and fail to be sensitive to 
changes we might undergo—this may have adverse consequences for 
our self-image and well-being.
rorty concedes that love and the other psychological attitudes which 
share the quality of historicity may be sometimes voluntary and inten-
tional; however she resists classifying them as voluntary or responsible 
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actions. “Interactive attitudes,” she writes, “are not necessarily caused by 
intentions or under voluntary control” (p. 400). Moreover, the historicity 
of these attitudes does not threaten their possible rationality. Indeed, 
because of the connections among rationality, human thriving, and the 
possible corrigibility of our psychological attitudes, it is worth thinking 
about the possible role for rationality in love. But there is a problem 
here: the lovers must perceive one another accurately, and their “attun-
ement” to one another must be appropriate. yet what conduces to the 
continuity of their love might not serve either of the lovers as individuals. 
Furthermore, whatever contributes to the development and thriving of 
one of the lovers might not contribute to the harmony between the two 
of them. all of these depend on factors that are speciic or tied to the 
historicity of each particular relationship. so there is a limit to what we 
can say in general philosophical terms about love and rationality. as rorty 
herself puts it, “It is only the details of their particular situation that 
can determine what would be rational, what would be appropriate, what 
would constitute (whose?) thriving” (p. 411).
Is rorty’s skepticism here justiied? While it seems correct that love 
has a historicity in something like the way she describes it, does it really 
follow that little can be said in general terms about love, rationality, and 
thriving? rorty seems to be led to her skeptical view by the decision, at 
the outset, not to classify love together with voluntary and responsible 
actions. In doing so, she risks collapsing a distinction between desire, 
which may be completely one-sided and unrequited, and the love which 
forms the foundation of a loving relationship. (and it seems clear 
that rorty’s concern is with this kind of love, rather than with desire 
alone, since her examples in the article are of love within continuing 
relationships.) While desires may be involuntary and may overcome us 
without our consent, romantic love is at least in part elective. this is not 
to say that we can choose whom we love, anymore that we can choose 
to believe in God. But (as Pascal realized long ago) religious feelings 
can be encouraged or depressed by one’s actions; feelings of love and 
desire are similarly subject to behavioral modiication. Love need not 
be pursued. romantic relationships can be initiated or ended at either 
individual’s whim. Most people do not pursue every person whom they 
desire—practicality, time and existing commitments being only some 
of the likely constraints.
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II
d. W. Hamlyn, another philosopher to address the “anne Gregory 
problem,” defends an equally cautious, though less skeptical position. 
Hamlyn considers the limits of the intelligibility of the terms “love” and 
“hate” where beliefs about their objects are missing, and frames the 
question thus: “If one does love X, what beliefs must one have about X, 
and how must one see or regard X if it is really to be love?” He answers 
that love (and hate) can be considered rational and justiied when 
their objects have certain appropriate qualities. yet if such qualities are 
lacking, it does not necessarily follow that the love or hate is irrational, 
even if we might want to say that it is non-rational. Loving someone is 
compatible with having no respect for him, inding him distasteful, or 
recognizing in him signiicant character laws. Hamlyn concludes that 
there is no particular belief that the lover must have about the object 
of love. However while such beliefs are not a necessary requirement 
for love, it would be “odd” if love and hate always lacked appropriate 
beliefs. Human love and hate could not universally be like that. so love 
must, in general, make some place for rationality, even if we cannot say 
exactly what that place is.
What Hamlyn says about the rationality of love seems correct, but 
misplaced. Whether or not a lover has adequate and appropriate beliefs 
about the beloved is only part of the story. Hamlyn’s “epistemology” of 
love is one-sided and thus inadequate. We see this clearly when we turn 
to the beloved; in this case to anne. 
III
We know that anne inds the poet’s claim that she will not be loved 
for herself “alone” to be troubling because of her reply to him, which 
comprises the second stanza:
But I can get a hair-dye
and set such colour there,
Brown, or black, or carrot,
that young men in despair
May love me for myself alone
and not my yellow hair.
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the philosophers who have discussed or alluded to yeats’s poem are 
mostly concerned with the irst and third stanzas and pay little heed 
to the second. this is unfortunate. If the second stanza is ignored or 
(as Hamlyn does) paraphrased hastily then anne is rendered as mute 
and anonymous as the beautiful boys who are the initial objects of love 
on Plato’s ladder in the Symposium. as many have argued, the notion 
of reciprocity and relatedness are crucial to romantic love, and indeed 
to many human interactions. romantic love for another person, as 
distinguished from unexpressed yearning or longing or from love for 
a person’s memory, is intrinsically dialogic. yeats acknowledges this in 
giving anne a voice.
there are several reasons why anne might ind the poet’s words dis-
maying. First, there is the matter of exclusivity as opposed to fungiblity.4 
anne might reasonably expect that if her young man loves her truly 
he will be willing to forsake others. she probably also wants to feel that 
she is special in the regard of the young man; she does not want to feel 
that she could be the substitute for another woman, or that another 
woman could be readily substituted for her. But if what the young man 
loves in anne is her blond hair, will he also love this property when it 
is manifested in any other woman? that is, is anne loved merely as an 
exemplar of a blond woman—is she loved simply qua blond woman 
rather than qua anne—and might her young man thus love any and 
every blond woman he encounters? Might he even be rationally con-
strained to do so?5
yet the poet’s words are more careful (and more crafty) than I have 
suggested thus far. It is anne who is loved; not her hair. thus the distinc-
tions among loving universals, loving particular properties, and loving 
properties as manifested in speciic individuals, need not concern us very 
much. the opening stanza presented the reader with a paradox. anne 
is loved, but she is loved for a feature that she and others might regard 
as accidental, incidental, and trivial. nonetheless she is truly loved, or so 
the poet claims. Is anne truly loved if she is loved simply for her beauti-
ful hair, and not for herself ? typically we demand of romantic love, if it 
is true love, that it be for the whole person, the whole self. the proper 
object of love is seen to be persons, not their physical manifestations, and 
certainly not their hair. this issue of the proper object of love is closely 
connected with the ideal of love’s durability or longevity. We want love 
to endure, and physical beauty (and hair color) are transitory. In the 
words of another poet, “But beauty vanishes, beauty passes; / However 
rare—rare it be.”6 Most human beings, men and women, outlive the 
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period of their greatest physical attractiveness. Persons or selves are 
the proper objects of love, partly because these are thought to endure, 
setting aside brain-transplant operations, episodes of the fugue, and 
other traumatic breaks. to be loved for beauty alone is to be doomed 
to be unloved when that beauty passes. that is another reason why the 
poet’s words to anne are so dark and so troubling.
yet so far we have not reached the crux of the matter both as to why 
anne is dismayed and why it is rational that she be dismayed. there is 
another reason, aside from their relative durability, why selves are the 
proper object of love, and not just of romantic love. this has to do 
with personal identity. In a tradition that begins with david Hume and 
adam smith in the eighteenth century, continues with George Herbert 
Mead, and inluences the work of contemporary feminists and others, 
the self is seen as at least partly constituted by others, and by our rela-
tions with others. We can say this without also making metaphysically 
dubious claims to the effect that the lover and the beloved are united 
to form a “super entity,” a worry expressed cogently by deborah Brown. 
For better or worse, our selves are constituted by the many relations we 
enter into on a daily basis, loving and otherwise. Part of the “work” of 
any loving relationship—be it between romantic partners, friends, or 
parents and children—is the reinforcement of one another’s personal 
identities. this is true both of the particular roles that each of us plays 
every day and of our more general sense of persisting as a person in 
the world. this mutual identity-constitution takes place among family 
members, intimates, casual acquaintances and strangers hundreds of 
times a day. Many of these interactions will be quickly forgotten, yet 
others will have profound and lingering effects.7 
If young men love anne for her blond hair, there is a possibility that 
they relate to her not as a full person, but merely as an exemplar of a 
blond woman. If this is so then we can imagine deleterious consequences 
for anne’s identity—her image of herself as relected back to her by 
others. anne may realize that she has beautiful hair. she may even be 
proud of her hair. But it does not follow that her hair is the cornerstone 
of her identity, or that she should want others to relate to her as though 
it was. anne, clearly, does want to be loved for her self alone and not 
for her hair. she regards her hair color as inessential to who she is; it is 
something easily changed. Her words express the anxiety of a beautiful 
woman who is perhaps wary of her own beauty.8 she is willing to alter 
what others regard as her most beautiful feature in order that they not 
love her on account of this feature, but for what she regards as her 
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essential self. anne’s assertion of control over her hair color is also an 
expression of desire to control how others see her. In controlling the 
image that others have of her, she seeks to have them reinforce those 
aspects of her personal identity that are more salient to her than the 
color of her hair. We already know, from the poem’s inal stanza, that 
any attempts anne might make in this direction would be futile. While 
she might have control over her hair, she has at best limited control 
over others’ desire.
It would be unproblematic for us and for anne if she was desired for 
her blond hair; dificulties arise because the poet tells her she is loved 
for it. Can the love of a person’s physical attributes be so strong as to 
eclipse love of the self “alone”? the poet is clear that anne is loved; but 
she is loved for her beautiful hair. are we to accept that beauty can be 
so alluring as to arouse love, in addition to desire? alexander nehemas 
has argued that to love someone is to ind him or her beautiful. While 
this may be true surely the contrary need not hold. to ind someone 
beautiful is not necessarily to love him or her. Perhaps the besotted young 
man will be disappointed when he gets to know anne. Perhaps he will 
not like her very much in the end. so why is the poet so conident that 
anne is truly loved? the answer is obvious, but easily overlooked. He 
knows anne, even if we do not. He knows all about her lovable qualities. 
that is why he can be so conident that others will love her too.
Must we believe the poet? Perhaps he has simply collapsed the differ-
ence between love and desire. Perhaps he tells anne that she is loved, 
concealing (out of propriety?) his actual belief that the young men lust 
for her because of her hair. Indeed the phrase “young men in despair” 
suggests thwarted desire. Love and desire are often contrasted with one 
another. desire may be unruly and wildly particular; we hold it account-
able to few rules. It may be completely one-sided and unrequited. a 
person need not even ever know that he or she is an object of desire. 
there is nothing wrong or mistaken in the desires of a person who is 
especially attracted by those with blond hair, or any speciic color hair. 
the person who is attracted only to blondes does not do some kind 
of injustice to brunettes and redheads. We accept the particularity of 
desire. rightly or wrongly, we seem to take a different attitude to love, 
setting aside the accepted and occasionally irrational love of parents 
for their children. I believe that we should resist this suggestion that 
anne is desired rather than loved and accept at face value the words 
of the poet that she is loved. If anne is merely desired on account of 
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her beautiful hair then there is no problem to be addressed, and the 
poem can no longer be appreciated for its exquisite balance between a 
dark content and the sunny expression that alleviates it.
I have stressed the ways in which lovers constitute and reinforce one 
another’s identity, and the corresponding importance of allowing one-
self to be loved for qualities that one regards as properly pertaining to 
one’s self “alone.” this is not just a matter of what rorty discusses as the 
importance of correct perception attunement between lovers, and what 
Hamlyn calls correct beliefs about the object of love. the rationality of 
love is not just a matter of deciding what is or is not truly loveable or 
of “drawing a line” between rationality and irrationality. It is also about 
allowing oneself to be loved for certain qualities, and thus allowing 
oneself to be constituted by others in certain ways. But which qualities 
and in which ways? Is there anything general philosophical to be said 
here, or must we be satisied with rorty’s particularism? 
although it is tricky, we can respect the historicity of each loving 
relationship and still say something of general import. the key here is 
agency. an important part of the kind of love that forms the basis of 
committed relationships is the desire for reciprocity. We want those we 
love to love us in return. this is ordinarily true of both familial love and 
romantic love. reciprocity requires agency. In allowing ourselves to be 
constituted by others, we must resist those who would constitute us in ways 
that are not conducive to the formation and continuation of reciprocal 
relationships. Loving anne for her beauty might be something like lov-
ing her as an art object. such an attitude would hardly be conducive to 
reciprocity because it denies the loved one agency. We can love artworks 
and other beautiful objects, but they do not love us back. 
desire may be non-volitional; we may not be able to choose whom 
we are attracted or who is attracted to us. But the love that is intrinsic 
to human lourishing is typically held to more stringent standards of 
rationality. It may not be irrational to love anne for her yellow hair. 
one may not have a choice in the matter. But it would be irrational for 
anne to allow her lovers to relate to her in such a way that her identity 
is constituted as being lovable for the color of her hair.
ontario College of art and design, toronto
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I am grateful to Alice MacLachlan and Ian Jarvie for comments and suggestions.
1. I will refer to the main speaker of the poem as “the poet” to distinguish him from 
yeats, the author of the poem, and I will refer to the woman addressed in the poem as 
“anne,” to distinguish her from the historical anne Gregory.
2. I have beneited from reading and thinking about the following philosophical dis-
cussions of love: deborah Brown, “the right Method of Boy-Loving,” in Love, Analyzed, 
ed. roger e. Lamb (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 49–63; ronald de sousa, “the 
rationality of emotions,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. amelie rorty (Berkeley: university 
of California Press, 1980), pp. 127–52; Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: 
Princeton university Press, 2004); d. W. Hamlyn, “the Phenomena of Love and Hate,” 
Philosophy 53 (1978): 5–20; niko Kolodny, “Love as valuing a relationship,” Philosophical 
Review 112 (2003): 135–89; rebecca Kukla, “Holding the Body of another,” Symposium 
11 (2007): 397–408; roger e. Lamb, “Love and rationality,” in Love, Analyzed, pp. 23–47; 
alexander nehemas, “‘only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ 
Plato, Symposium 211d,” European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2007): 1–18; Martha nussbaum, 
“Love and the Individual: romantic rightness and Platonic aspiration,” in Love, Analyzed, 
pp. 1–22; amelie oksenberg rorty, “the Historicity of Psychological attitudes: Love is 
not Love Which alters not When it alteration Finds,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 
(1986): 399–412; Laurence thomas, “reasons for Loving,” in The Philosophy of (Erotic) 
Love, ed. robert C. solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Laurence: university Press of 
Kansas, 1991), pp. 467–76; and J. david velleman, “Love as a Moral emotion,” Ethics 
109 (1999): 338–74.
3. Compare nehemas on this point with Gregory vlastos, “the Individual as an object of 
Love in Plato,” Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1973), pp. 3–34.
4. rorty inds the issue of exclusivity to be anne’s main worry. see de sousa for a 
discussion of love and fungibility.
5. For extended discussion of the general issues, see Brown, nussbaum, and Lamb.
6. Walter de la Mare, “an epitaph.”
7. For example, Laurence thomas has written powerfully about how those in socially 
marginalized groups may be downwardly constructed by others. see “Moral deference,” 
Philosophical Forum 24 (1992–93): 233–50.
8. a similar anxiety is expressed in yeats’s “a Prayer for my daughter”: “May she be 
granted beauty and yet not / Beauty to make a stranger’s eye distraught / or hers 
before a looking-glass.”
